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Abstract—In recent years fingerprinting of various physical and
logical devices has been proposed with the goal of uniquely
identifying users or devices of mainstream IT systems such
as PCs, Laptops and smart phones. On the other hand,
the application of such techniques in Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPS) is less explored due to various reasons, such as difficulty
of direct access to critical systems and the cost involved in
faithfully reproducing realistic scenarios. In this work we
evaluate the feasibility of using fingerprinting techniques in
the context of realistic Industrial Control Systems related
to water treatment and distribution. Based on experiments
conducted with 44 sensors of six different types, it is shown that
noise patterns due to microscopic imperfections in hardware
manufacturing can be used to uniquely identify sensors in a
CPS with up to 97% accuracy. The proposed technique can be
used in to detect physical attacks, such as the replacement of
legitimate sensors by faulty or manipulated sensors. We also
show that, unexpectedly, sensor fingerprinting can effectively
detect advanced physical attacks such as analog sensor spoofing
due to variations in received energy at the transducer of an
active sensor. Also, it can be leveraged to construct a novel
challenge-response protocol that exposes cyber-attacks.
1. Introduction
A Cyber Physical System (CPS) is a distributed com-
puting system that is sensing and actuating on the physical
world [1], [2]. For instance large critical infrastructures, such
as power generation and water treatment plants, are particu-
lar examples of CPS, also known as Industrial Control Sys-
tems (ICS) [3]. An ICS consists of cyber components such
as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), sensors, actu-
ators, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
workstation, and Human Machine Interface (HMI) elements
interconnected via a communications network. The PLCs
and the SCADA workstation operate in concert to control the
physical process. The widespread use of such technology,
and the increasing number of incidents involving it [4], [5],
[6], has raised concern on the security of CPS [7].
Different from an attack against conventional IT sys-
tems, an attack on a CPS may directly result in physical
damage to property (for instance due to an explosion [8],
[9]) and the loss of human life (such as operators of the CPS
or people depending on a critical infrastructure). Security
requirements of a CPS are thus different from those found
in conventional cyber security [7], in particular the physical
integrity of the system and its availability are often more
important than confidentiality aspects [10]. Moreover, in a
CPS an attacker may not only compromise the computing
elements but he might partially also do so for physical
components or the physical environment. This is illustrated
for instance by the recent attack of [11], where a crash
is induced in a drone by means of a sound signal that
confuses the gyroscope, or by recent analog sensor spoofing
attacks [12], [13], [14], [15]. This makes CPS security chal-
lenging, since we need to expand traditional attacker models
to include physical and cyber-physical characteristics of a
system [16], and consequently there is a need for novel
security solutions in the intersection of these worlds.
In a CPS thus, the veracity [10] of sensor data is
paramount to the security of the system [17]. The impact of
various kinds of integrity attacks on sensor values has been
studied mathematically in the control theory community,
including false data injection [18], replay attacks [19], and
stealthy attacks [20]. To implement such attacks in prac-
tice, attackers can spoof sensor values either by physical
means, as discussed above, for instance by analog spoofing
attacks [12], [13], [15], or by tampering with the communi-
cation channel between a sensor and a controller by means
of a classical man-in-the-middle attack [21].
Digital or cyber-attacks can be performed by attackers
who have compromised the CPS communication network
and can spoof digitized sensor readings. For instance, re-
verse engineering of the well-known Stuxnet worm [6], [22]
showed that it would attempt to perform a replay attack
of normal states of a CPS while carrying out an attack
to conceal it from human operators. Physical attacks can
be carried out by attackers who have physical access to
a CPS, such as malicious insiders [5], [23], [24], [25],
or attackers that have access to a CPS distributed over a
large geographical area [25]. For instance, water distribution
networks or smart grids are usually spread over hundreds
of miles across city, and thus it is hard to guard all the
components [26], [27]. In [24] ease of physically tampering
energy meters at the consumer end, without leaving any
evidence, is shown. Authors in [11], [15] report sensor
spoofing attacks by considering physical proximity of a few
centimeters to the victim. Therefore, physical attacks are
also a realistic threat model for a CPS [12], [14], [15], [23],
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[26], [27].
NoiSense: In this work we propose a non-intrusive sensor
fingerprinting method to authenticate sensors transmitting
measurements to one or more PLCs. Device fingerprinting
ideas based on clock skews, modulation schemes and trans-
mission circuitry, have been reported in the literature [28],
[29], [30], [31]. However, sensors in an ICS are not compu-
tationally powerful enough to exhibit the above mentioned
fingerprints [26]. Thus, we seek an answer to the question,
Do sensors in a real world ICS have unique fingerprints? It
is known that hardware imperfections during the manufac-
turing process exhibit some unique physical behaviors that
are useful for profiling and fingerprinting [32]. In particular,
we observe that noise (imperfections in measurements), an
otherwise undesirable feature of sensors, strongly depends
on such manufacturing imperfections. These variations af-
fect each device differently and thus are hard to control
or reproduce [33], making it challenging for an attacker to
imitate sensor noise pattern.
A technique, referred to as NoiSense, is designed to
fingerprint sensors found in ICS. NoiSense creates a fin-
gerprint for a sensor based on a set of time domain and
frequency domain features that are extracted from the sensor
noise. A machine learning algorithm is used to distinguish
an individual sensor from others. In particular, a multi-
class Support Vector Machine (SVM) is used to identify
each sensor from a dataset, comprising of a multitude of
industrial sensors. Experiments were performed on a total
of 44 sensors including 23 low cost ultrasonic level sensors
and 21 sensors of different types in an operational water
treatment and distribution facility accessible for research
[34], [35]. Sensor identification accuracy is observed to be
as high as 97%, with a low of 90%. It is also shown that
the proposed scheme is scalable for tens of sensors and that
the sensor fingerprint is stable over time. True positive rate
for sensor identification is observed to be 100% for most of
the sensors and false positive rate as low as 0%. The cost
of actual industrial scale sensors is typically a few thousand
dollars, which led us to design experiments for low cost
sensors. However, experiments performed on various type
of industrial sensors make it a representative study for a
general ICS framework.
NoiSense has certain advantages that make it suitable
for deployment in an ICS: (a) It is non-Intrusive, as no
modifications in CPS hardware are required. (b) It is a
passive fingerprinting technique that identifies a sensor in
an operational process without affecting its intended func-
tionality. (c) It is a low cost solution that can be used at
the design stage and also in an operational CPS without
any significant additional cost. (d) It does not require any
functional modifications to the system or control logic, other
than the addition of specific code in a controller, such as in
a PLC, to detect sensor tampering. One of the strongest
features of the proposed scheme is that, it is able to detect
attacks originating from physical (analog) as well as cyber
(digital) domains.
The major contributions of this work are thus:
• A novel sensor fingerprinting framework that is
based on sensor noise, and is a function of hardware
characteristics of a device.
• A detailed evaluation of the proposed fingerprinting
method, for a class of invasive and non-invasive
physical attacks.
• Extensive empirical performance evaluation on real-
istic testbeds as well as using controlled lab experi-
ments.
• A novel challenge-response protocol based on sensor
noise fingerprinting.
This work evaluates NoiSense in the context of water treat-
ment and water distribution testbeds [34], [35]. Commonly
found industrial sensors are studied, but without loss of
generality, these analysis are applicable to other industrial
applications.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Threat Model
In this work, we consider specific physical and cyber at-
tacks on sensor measurements in an ICS. First, we lay down
our assumptions about the attacker, followed by justification
for such assumptions. Attacker’s goals, objectives and attack
scenarios are also explained in detail.
Assumptions on Attacker: We consider a strong adversary
who is able to launch cyber and/or physical attacks. In
an ICS sensors, actuators and PLCs communicate with
each other via communication networks. An attacker can
compromise these communication links in a classic Man-in-
The-Middle (MiTM) attack [21], [36], [37], for example, by
breaking into the link between sensors and PLCs. Recent
studies, demonstrate malware attacks on PLCs [38], [39].
Besides false data injection in sensor readings via cyber
domain, an adversary can also physically tamper a sensor,
to drive a CPS into an unstable state. Therefore, we need to
authenticate sensor measurements, which are transmitted to
a controller. A malicious insider, is an attacker with physical
access to the plant and thus to its devices such as sensors. An
attacker can physically replace or tamper sensors. However,
such an attacker does not necessarily, need to be an insider,
because critical infrastructures, e.g.,for water and power,
are generally distributed across large areas [26], [27]. An
outsider, e.g., end user, can also carry out a physical attack
on sensors such as smart energy monitors. Physical attacks,
invasive and non-invasive, have also been considered as a
threat model in traditional IT systems [40], [41].
Attacker’s Goals(G): An attacker may choose his goals from
a set of intentions [42] such as performance degradation,
disturbing a system property, and damaging a component.
Physical Damage (G1): An attacker can damage devices
in a plant including pumping stations and other electrical
appliances. Doing so may cause injury to individuals in the
plant or at a large scale by altering the devices for instance
by flooding the surroundings of the plant with wastewater
as in the Maroochy Shire incident [5].
Reduction in Quality/Quantity of Product (G2): An attacker
can inject faults and defects in the product for a general
industrial control system. In particular, for water networks,
it can under-dose or over-dose certain chemicals to compro-
mise the water quality. It can also reduce the production,
resulting in water supply outages for the consumers.
Utility Theft (G3): Utility theft is usually done by the end
consumer. It can be achieved by tampering different kinds
of monitors/sensors [24]. One example is water theft from
canals/irrigation systems [43], [44].
Attacker’s Intermediary Objectives(O):
Concealment (O1): An attacker wants to conceal the attack
as much as possible [12]. For instance, in certain ICS [34],
it has been observed that disconnecting the sensor from
the controller or cutting the sensor wire to the controller,
does not raise any alarm by default, making such an attack
undetectable by default. In case of a stealthy cyber attack,
an attacker manipulates the sensor measurements according
to a precise mathematical model [20], [37], [45] to conceal
it’s actions.
Inaccurate Measurements and Signal Masking (O2): Physi-
cally replaced malicious sensors should report an inaccurate
and imprecise data to disturb the product quality. An attacker
can achieve the same objective of inaccurate measurements
by false data injection. Also, an adversary may prevent the
sensor to measure the true physical quantity. This can be
achieved by data injection in SCADA workstation [21], [36]
and also by masking the true quantity by overpowering the
original signal [12], [14].
Deceiving Controller (O3): The attacker attempts to
deceive the controller into believing that the data received
is from a legitimate sensor.
Attacker Characterization(C):
Attacker Profile (C1): Most likely attacker profile requiring
physical access is that of a malicious insider [46]. However,
for attacker goal G3 (utility theft), a consumer may be a
malicious entity. Another strong candidate for such an at-
tacker is casual outsider (malicious contractor or technician)
as defined in [23]. Considering the critical nature of these
utility infrastructures a nation state or a terrorist attacker
profile could not be ignored [46]. An outsider can break
into the system using cyber domain and may not necessarily
need physical access to the plant.
Technical Capabilities (C2): We assume an adversary,
(insider or outsider), has the complete knowledge of the
workings of the plant and sensing devices in particular. An
end user could employ services of a contractor, a criminal
entity, for sensor tampering, to achieve the utility theft
goal( G3).
Attack Scenarios (S): We categorize attack scenarios into
two categories, namely physical domain and cyber domain.
Physical (Analog Domain) Attacks:
Sensor Replacement Attack (S1): An attacker replaces one
or more sensors in the plant by new, perhaps malicious,
sensors. This way the attacker can manipulate the sensor
readings to drive the system to an undesirable state. The
attacker can inject arbitrary sensor data that may not be de-
tected by cyber attack detection schemes based on statistical
methods such as Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) [37].
Sensor Swap Attack (S2): Sensor swap attack uses the
legitimate control logic to achieve an attacker’s goal. Rather
than modifying the control logic, an attacker feeds a con-
troller with measurements from another process. The idea
is to use the existing control logic to drive the plant to an
insecure state. In appendix A, an example swap attack and
it’s consequences on a water treatment testbed are analyzed.
Sensor Saturation Attack(S3): Sensor saturation attack is
similar to jamming attacks and is executed by injecting
power to the sensor’s receiver [47]. A constant value is
measured by a sensor under attack and it is not able to
monitor the real physical quantity. Another way to achieve
a similar attack in industrial sensors is to block the physical
medium (either by wireless channel jamming or cutting
the wired media) between the sensor and remote IØ unit.
This attack also returns a constant reading to the SCADA
workstation. An attacker can remain stealthy for such attacks
as system raises no alarm. However, it is obvious that
transmitted constant reading does not contain sensor noise
component which enables NoiSense, to detect such attacks
or faults in components.
Figure 1. Analog Sensor Spoofing Attack.
Analog Sensor Spoofing Attack(S4): The attack scenarios
(S1,S2,S3), mentioned above, need physical access to the
plant and are also invasive requiring sensor tampering. An-
other type of physical attack can be non-invasive where
an attacker spoofs sensor measurements by disturbing the
surrounding environment. This can be achieved by bringing
another malicious entity (same type of device as the victim)
in proximity with the victim device. One such attack is
analog spoofing of the measured quantity [12] for a class
of active sensors. Active sensors transmit a probe signal
which interacts with the quantity to be measured and a
response signal is received and analyzed to measure the
physical quantity. But if an attacker has physical access
to the sensing environment, it can change the response
signal before it reaches the receiver. An example of such an
attacker is shown figure 1. Transmitter (TX) of the active
sensor transmits a probe signal and waits for the response
signal to be received. Rather than getting the legitimate
response signal, an attacker transmits a fake signal. When
this fake signal is received at the receiver (RX) of the active
sensor (victim), it would not be able to differentiate between
a legitimate and the signal generated by an attacker.
Network-based (Cyber Domain) Attacks:
Digital Domain Sensor Swap Attack(S5): This attack is
similar in concept to S2 but an attacker does not necessarily
need physical access to sensors. In control logic of the plant,
it is possible to exchange the tags for the sensors for their
respective PLCs [38]. PLC1 can be made to read sensor 2,
and PLC2 can be made to read sensor 1. The effects of
such a swap would be same as in the case of physical sensor
swap. However, such a change will not be reflected at the
SCADA workstation where human operators are monitoring
the process
False Data Injection in Sensor Measurements(S6): This at-
tack can be executed as MiTM whereby an attacker modifies
the unencrypted sensor data transmitted to a PLC [21], [36].
Such a modification will change the noise fingerprint of a
sensor and enable NoiSense to detect the attack.
Stealthy Attacks(S7): An attacker modifies a sensor mea-
surement and attempts to hide it’s presence. In the litera-
ture [37], [45], [48], [49], [50] specific stealthy attacks have
been designed to stay undetected for a range of statistical
detectors. To achieve the stealthiness an attacker must mod-
ify sensor measurement in a way so that it can maximize the
damage and remain undetected. To achieve this objective an
attacker will inevitably change the sensor noise which will
enable NoiSense, to detect the presence of the attacker.
Replay and Advanced Sensor Spoofing Attacks(S8): In a
replay attack an attacker records the system states for the
normal operation of the system. Then it replays recorded
states during an attack to hide itself from operators and
digital domain intrusion detection systems [19], [50]. An
example of such an attack is Stuxnet [6]. A replay attack
on sensor measurements might not be detected by NoiSense
because sensor noise will also be replayed. Another example
is of a very powerful cyber attacker with an ability to learn
noise fingerprint of a sensor. It can modify sensor measure-
ments to arbitrary values and also add noise patterns for
that sensor, making it strong enough to remain undetected
by NoiSense. We extend the idea of NoiSense for the case
of such a powerful cyber attacker by proposing a novel
challenge-response scheme presented in section 5.
2.2. Sensing Technologies
In this section we explain the basic working principle of
the sensing technologies under study. This insight in sensor
iSolv ultrasonic
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Electromagnetic
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      iSolv RD700
RADAR level sensor
     HC-SR04 dual transducer
            ultrasonic sensor
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Figure 2. Sensors used in experiments.
construction and functionality is an aid in understanding the
sources of sensor noise and fingerprints.
Ultrasonic Level Sensors: Water treatment testbeds use ul-
trasonic sensors based on a piezoelectric (PZT ceramic) ma-
terial transducer. The level of water in a tank is calculated by
measuring the return time of the acoustic wave after hitting
the water surface. Several factors contribute to variations in
the measurements obtained from ultrasonic sensors. These
measurements depend on the speed of sound which changes
according to the surrounding temperature [51]. Besides tem-
perature, obstacles like tank walls reflect echo sooner than
expected, contributing towards noise in the measurements.
The acoustic impedance of the PZT transducers also depends
on temperature thus adding another source of noise [52].
Thermal and polarization noise are the main sources of
voltage fluctuation in piezoelectric ceramics [53].
Microwave Level Sensors: The microwave level/distance
sensor, often called RADAR (Radio Distance and Ranging),
works in a similar way as ultrasonic sensors. A microwave
pulse is emitted by the antenna that travels at the speed of
light and upon hitting the surface of the target it is reflected
back and received at the same antenna. These antennae are
designed to have a 50Ω resistance so that once connected
with a cable of characteristic impedance of 50Ω, maximum
power transfer takes place from the antenna. The sensor
under consideration is designed to operate at 26 GHz with
a beam angle of 22o and 1µW effective radiated power
[54]. However, in practice these specifications have devi-
ation for the same type and design of an antenna due to
manufacturing imperfections and installation inaccuracies.
For example, antenna connection with a cable will result in
impedance variations [55]. Also, beam angle and radiation
pattern varies for each antenna leading to deviations from
theoretical design resulting in different range resolution that
is ultimately reflected in sensor noise [56].
Electromagnetic Flow Meters: The electromagnetic flow
meters follow Faraday’s law of induction according to which
a voltage is induced by an electrically conductive fluid
passing through a magnetic field. In an electromagnetic
flow meter, the medium acts as the electrical conductor
when flowing through the flow meter tube, and the induced
voltage is proportional to the average flow velocity (the
faster the flow rate, the higher the voltage). A commercial
electromagnetic flow meter is shown in Figure 2 [57]. It’s
internal structure consists of a pair of coils mounted on
the top and bottom of an electrically insulated flow tube.
A pair of electrodes protrude through the flow tube wall
perpendicular to the pipe axes and largely normal to the
direction of the generated magnetic field. Noise in these
sensor readings come from the area of the electrodes and
size of the electro-magnets generating electromagnetic field
B. The installation and alignment of electrodes and coils
will result in different stray capacitance and noise [58].
3. Design of NoiSense
Figure 3 shows the steps involved in composing a sensor
fingerprint. The proposed scheme begins with data collection
and then divides data into smaller chunks to extract a set
of time domain and frequency domain features. Features are
combined and labeled with a sensor ID. A machine learning
algorithm is used for sensor classification.
3.1. Data Collection
Data is collected for different types of industrial sensors
listed in Table 2. We collect data for the level sensors when
the process is static, i.e. tank levels are constant. For flow
meters, data is collected when process is dynamic, i.e.
water is flowing through the pipes and hence a non-zero
flow rate is observed. The objective of data collection step
is to extract sensor noise. For the case of level sensors,
when the process is running, an error in sensor reading
is a combination of sensor noise and process noise (water
sloshing etc.). Extracting process noise from a dynamic
process is a challenging task, given that the noise parameters
vary with change in the process state. Therefore, a set
of experiments for level sensors, are designed to obtain
sensor measurements, when a process is not active. Tanks
store water to provide to subsequent stages for processing.
However, these processes are not always active as water
demand is not constant. If there is no inflow and outflow of
water, in a tank, the corresponding level sensor measurement
should be a constant. Nevertheless, there are fluctuations
in the sensor measurements, as a result of sensor noise or
temperature variations. In the controlled lab environment,
temperature is controlled, and it affects all the sensors in a
similar way.
We have a limited number of level sensors in water
treatment testbed, but we diversified experiments to validate
the proposed idea. A total of 3 level sensors are installed
on top of 3 water tanks. Each sensor is placed on all the
three water tanks, to collect data for all possible sensor-tank
combinations. The data is analyzed, in time and frequency
domains, to examine the noise patterns, which are found
to follow Gaussian distribution. Sensors are profiled using
variance and other statistical features in the noise vector.
The experiment is run, to obtain sensor profile, so that it
can be used for later testing. A machine learning algorithm
is used to profile sensors from fresh readings (test-data).
Design and testing, of NoiSense, is feasible in settings of a
water treatment plant. According to the control logic, when a
tank is filled up to a specified limit, a pumping station turns
OFF and the water level stays at a constant value. Since
these water treatment systems, have multiple processing
stages, there are instances when there is neither an incoming
flow nor an outgoing flow from a tank, i.e. we have a
constant water level in the tank. During these instances, we
can record the data and match it with previously generated
TABLE 1. LIST OF FEATURES USED.
Feature Description
Mean x¯ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi
Std-Dev σ =
√
1
N−1
∑N
i=1(xi − x¯i)2
Mean Avg. Dev Dx¯ = 1N
∑N
i=1 |xi − x¯|
Skewness γ = 1
N
∑N
i=1(
xi−x¯
σ
)3
Kurtosis β = 1
N
∑N
i=1(
xi−x¯
σ
)4 − 3
Spec. Std-Dev σs =
√∑N
i=1(yf (i)
2)∗ym(i)∑N
i=1 ym(i)
Spec. Centroid Cs =
∑N
i=1(yf (i))∗ym(i)∑N
i=1 ym(i)
DC Component ym(0)
Vector x is time domain data from the sensor for N elements in the
data chunk. Vector y is the frequency domain feature of sensor data.
yf is the vector of bin frequencies and ym is the magnitude of the
frequency coefficients.
fingerprint. Fingerprints can be generated over time or at the
commissioning phase of the plant.
For flow meters, if there is no water flow, we receive
a value of 0 from the sensor. In the testbeds under study,
the flow of water between different stages is controlled by a
pump. Therefore, water flow through a pipe should be con-
stant but flow rate data transmitted by the electromagnetic
sensor is noisy. We treat these fluctuations in the sensor
data as noise and collect this information during the times
when process is running. For the case of low cost ultrasonic
sensors, we designed an experiment where a constant water
level is to be measured. Noise in each sensor is extracted
and data analyzed to generate the fingerprint. Thus, by
combining the level sensor and flow meter features, we are
able to monitor the process, in both static (constant water
level) and dynamic (water flowing) states.
  Fourier
Transform
 Spectral 
 Features 
Feature Combination
Figure 3. Components of NoiSense, design.
3.2. Feature Extraction
Data is collected from sensors at a sampling rate of one
every second. Since data is collected over time, we can use
raw data to extract time domain features. We used the Fast
Fourier Transform (FFT) algorithm [59] to convert data
to frequency domain and extract the spectral features. In
total, as in Table 1, eight features are used to construct the
fingerprint.
Data Chunking: After data collection from the sensors,
the next step is to create chunks of dataset. An important
question to answer is: How many chunks of data are needed
to train a well-performing machine learning model? Also,
we want to know, how much time it will take to perform
a test? so that a decision about the attacks can be made
within a specified time. To this end we create data chunks
of varying size for each sensor. After dividing a sensor’s
data (total of N readings) into m chunks, each chunk of
bNmc, the feature set < F (Ci) > for each data chunk i
is calculated For each sensor, there are m sets of features
< F (Ci) >i∈[1,m]. For n sensors one can use n×m sets of
features to train the multi-class SVM. Supervised learning
was used for sensor identification which has two phases–
training and testing. For both the phases, chunks are created
in a similar way as explained above.
Size of Training and Testing Dataset: An important question
to address is: How many feature sets are needed for training
the classifier and how many for testing? For a total of m
feature sets for each sensor, at first half (m2 ) were used for
training and half (m2 ) for testing. To analyze the accuracy of
the classifier for smaller feature sets was reduced during the
training phase, number of feature sets starting with m2 . Clas-
sification is then carried out for the following corresponding
range of feature sets for Training : {m2 , m3 , m4 , m5 , m10},
and for Testing : {m2 , 2m3 , 3m4 , 4m5 , 9m10 }, respectively. In
section 4, empirical results are presented for such feature set
and the one with the best performance is chosen for further
analysis of the proposed scheme. For the classifier a multi-
class SVM is used [60], as briefly described in Appendix B.
3.3. Performance Metrics
In Table 2, sensors of same type are grouped together.
Each sensor is assigned a unique ID and a multi-class
classification is applied to identify each sensor among those
of the same type and model group. To evaluate the per-
formance, identification accuracy is used as a performance
metric. Let c be the total number of classes. TPi as true
positive for class ci when it is rightly classified based on the
ground truth. False negative FNi is defined as the wrongly
rejected, and false positive FPi as wrongly accepted, device.
True negative TNi is the rightly rejected class. The overall
accuracy (acc) for total of c classes is defined as in the
following.
acc =
∑c
i=1 TPi +
∑c
i=1 TNi∑c
i=1 TPi +
∑c
i=1 TNi +
∑c
i=1 FPi +
∑c
i=1 FNi
.
(1)
TABLE 2. LIST OF SENSORS IN OUR STUDY.
Type No. of Devices Class
Ultrasonic level sensor 3 C1
RADAR level sensor 2 C2
HCSR-04 dual transducer 5V 15 C3
HCSR-04 dual transducer 3.3V 5 C4
Electromagnetic Flow Meter 8 C5
SRF02 single transducer Sonar 3 C6
Differential Pressure Transmitter 8 C7
The True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR)
are defined as follows,
True Positive Rate (TPR) =
TP
TP + FN
, (2)
False Positive Rate (FPR) =
FP
FP + TN
. (3)
Actuators
Figure 4. System Model for Proposed Methodology.
4. Evaluation
The underlying idea for the proposed method is to find
a fingerprint from the extracted noise of sensors under con-
sideration. Figure 4 shows the integration of the proposed
scheme to any existing ICS without need of additional
hardware installation. Also, the proposed method is passive
and does not disrupt the functionality of the control system.
Research Questions: The following research questions are
the focus of the remainder of this work.
RQ1: Does a unique fingerprint exist for each sensor?
RQ2: How much data is needed to identify a sensor?
RQ3: How accurately can the sensors be identified?
RQ4: Is a fingerprint unique with respect to multiple sen-
sors such as is the case in a large CPS?
RQ5: Is the sensor fingerprint stable between different
runs of the experiment over a period of time?
RQ6: Is the sensor fingerprint based method able to detect
analog sensor spoofing attacks?
Sensor data is analyzed for different sets of sensors to
answer the above questions. Extensive data collection and
analysis is carried out to obtain the fingerprint and show that
indeed this is a valid fingerprint. The following sections de-
scribe the experimentation setup as well as results obtained
by applying the proposed attack detection scheme.
4.1. Experimentation Setup
Experiments described in this article were conducted
on an operational water distribution and water treatment
systems. One testbed is a fully operational research facility
and a scaled down water treatment plant. The other testbed is
a water distribution network [34], [35]. Additional informa-
tion on these testbeds is in the appendices C and D. Besides
using the sensors in the two testbeds, 23 small ultrasonic
sensors were also used to show that the proposed scheme
can scale well to a larger set of sensors. Table 2 lists the
sensors used in this study. These sensors are representative
of those found in a range of industrial plants as fluid storage
and flow is a common process [61].
Ultrasonic Level Sensors (Water Treatment Testbed): Ex-
periments were performed on a portion of the six stage
water treatment testbed [34]. Three ultrasonic level sensors,
available in this testbed, were used in the experiments. Data
was collected first from three level sensors in their original
tank installation and also by mounting on the other tanks.
These experiments were performed for several hours each
day and over several months. An SVM model was trained
over the data obtained in original positions of the sensors.
For each sensor, testing data was obtained by placing the
sensor over the other tanks. This experiment demonstrated:
a) changing the process (tank) does not change the finger-
print, and b) fingerprint is stable and valid for long term,
e.g., it is valid for data collected at different times over a
period of six months.
Flow Meters (Water Treatment Testbed): Electromagnetic
flow meters are installed in pipes to monitor the water flow.
Data was collected while the plant was running. For flow
meters, sensor swap is not as simple as level sensors, since
these are installed in-line on a water pipe. Therefore, a
5-fold cross validation results are reported in Table 5 for
the four flow meters (from each testbed) used in the study.
Several measurement vectors were obtained for the water
filling process for up to six days continuous run of the plant.
The noise vector for each process was extracted and feature
set obtained.
RADAR Level Sensors (Water Distribution Testbed): Two
radio frequency based level sensors are available for experi-
ments in the water distribution testbed [35]. Experiments
were performed for three days and data collected. A 5-
fold cross validation was performed using SVM and sensors
identified with high accuracy.
Dual Transducer Ultrasonic Sensors (HCSR04): A limited
number of industrial sensors were available to perform the
experiments. Details of such sensors are given above. It is
costly to acquire a lot of such sensors. Therefore, a set
of experiments was designed to test our approach on 20
low cost ultrasonic sensors. The working principle of these
low cost sensors is the same as for those used in industrial
scale sensors. The goal of these experiments was to explore
whether a large set of sensors can be uniquely fingerprinted
and identified with high accuracy? Among these 20 sensors,
15 are double transducer ultrasonic sensors which require
5V DC to operate, while the remaining 5 sensors require
3.3V DC to operate. This variety of operation voltages adds
to the diversity in the experiments.
The setup to conduct the experiments on ultrasonic
sensors is shown in Figure 10(Appendix E). It is composed
of the following main components: 1) a tank is created
with a small half-filled water glass, 2) breadboard to hold
the ultrasonic sensor, 3) Arduino board (controller) that is
connected to sensor, and 4) a server to collect and store
data from sensors over WiFi. The Arduino board has a
microcontroller and several input/output pins that serve as an
interface for external circuitry [62]. Ultrasonic sensors can
be easily mounted and removed from the breadboard. Same
water level is ensured in the tank for all the sensors. Multiple
rounds of experiments were performed to ensure that noise
is free of the physical sensor arrangement. Sensor readings
were collected over three hours with a sampling time of
1 second. Several chunks of data were extracted from these
sets of readings and features extracted for each chunk. After
collecting data for three hours we removed the sensor from
the tank and put it back and collected data for an additional
two hours. This is to demonstrate that the fingerprint can be
recovered even after disturbing the sensor alignment.
Single Transducer Sonar Sensors (SRF02): Three small
single transducer sonar range finders were also included
in the experiments. The basic working principle of these
sensors is the same as that of dual transducer ultrasonic sen-
sors though with minor differences. These sensors (SRF02)
use a single transducer for both transmission and reception,
and the minimum range is higher than the dual transducer
sensors used in the experiments. The minimum measure-
ment range varies from around 17-18 cm. For this reason a
distance measuring experiment was performed with these
three sensors rather than measuring water level in small
glass tanks. These experiments were controlled through the
Arduino board and placed at the same place to measure
distance between sensors and the ceiling. Experiments were
run for 6 hours with one run of 3 hours and a second run
of 3 hours to explore the stability of the sensor fingerprint.
4.2. Existence of Fingerprint
RQ1: Does a unique fingerprint exist for each sensor?
A limited number of sensors were available in the water
utility testbeds. Hence, additional low cost ultrasonic sensors
are included to explore the existence of fingerprints for
many sensors of the same type and model. To demonstrate
the existence of fingerprint, ten dual transducer ultrasonic
sensors (HCSR04) from the same manufacturer were used.
All ten sensors were mounted on the same water tank. Data
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Figure 5. Noise data from ten ultrasonic sensors of same type (HC SR04). Left: Variance for each sensor noise vector is shown for different data chunks
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Figure 6. Three features have improved the clustering and unique identifi-
cation of the sensors as compared to using only the variance or the mean.
This is a 3D representation of the right-most plot in Figure 5.
was collected for 3 hours and many chunks of the collected
data taken for analysis. Each chunk consists of 300 readings
from the sensor. Figure 5 shows results for the collected
data. The plot on the left shows the variance of noise vector
from each sensor for all chunks. It is observed that some
of these sensors have a unique noise variance and can be
distinguished from each other but there remain few sensors
that have similar noise pattern in terms of noise variance.
The middle pane is a plot of the distribution of the noise
vector from each sensor. It also shows that sensors can
be distinguished based on noise statistics. However, there
remain overlaps among some sensors. Right pane shows 2-
D clustering of the sensors. Sensors can be distinguished
more precisely by using one more feature of sensor’s noise
i.e. mean value. The scatter plot on the right hand side
clusters each chunk with its respective mean and variance.
The separation is quite clear but there remain overlaps, e.g.,
sensor4, sensor8 and sensor10. We need additional features
to further eliminate such overlaps. In Figure 6, by adding one
more feature, i.e. mean average deviation, sensor4, sensor8
and sensor10 can be distinguished. In the following sections
we show that by using additional features it is possible to
achieve high accuracy for sensor identification. Details of
feature set used are in Table 1.
4.3. Sensor Identification Accuracy
RQ2: How much data do we need to identify a sensor? We
start our analysis with 20 dual transducer small ultrasonic
sensors. The goal now is to find how much training data
is adequate to identify sensors with high accuracy. Also,
we are interested in knowing the chunk size of data to
extract features. Table 4 shows results from our analysis.
The first row shows the size of training and testing data set,
respectively, where m is total number of chunks for a sensor.
The first column in the table shows chunk size starting from
60 seconds to 1000 seconds. It is observed that too small a
chunk size does the accuracy is slightly lower as compared
to chunks in the middle range. A large chunk size, as for
example 1000, limits the chunks and hence leads to a small a
feature set. Doing so results in lower identification accuracy.
If we move towards right in the row, the size of the training
data set is reducing, which also results in lower accuracy.
This result is intuitive. However, we select a chunk size of
120 seconds which is not too small that it could not capture
sensor noise statistics and not too large that we have to wait
too long before reaching a decision about authenticity of
the sensor. Also, it was decided to divide the entire sensor
data set in three parts and used one third for training for
further experiments. For 20 low cost ultrasonic sensors, this
choice of chunk size and training data set provided 96.43%
accuracy for sensor identification as shown in Table 4.
For a chunk size of 120 seconds, and one third of
data set for training, the SVM classifier, a multi-class SVM
classification for 20 dual transducer ultrasonic sensors was
carried out. It was possible to distinguish sensors with an
accuracy of 96.43%. Figure 12 (Appendix D) shows the
same result visually with a plot of the confusion matrix
as a heat map for these 20 sensors. The horizontal axis
represents actual sensor ID, while the vertical axis represents
the predicted sensor ID by the SVM classifier. We note that
nearly all sensors are accurately identified, and hence, on
diagonal of the confusion matrix, the prediction accuracy is
close to 100%.
TABLE 3. IDENTIFICATION EVALUATION FOR EACH SENSOR. FPR: FALSE POSITIVE RATE, TPR: TRUE POSITIVE RATE.
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20
TPR 1 0.87 1 1 1 0.97 1 1 0.99 0.98 1 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.86 0.97 1 0.94 0.97 1
FPR 3.4e−3 0.9e−3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.2e−3 0 1.2e−3 2.2e−3 1.2e−3 7.4e−3 2.2e−3 0 0.6e−3 0 0
TABLE 4. CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY FOR 20 SMALL ULTRASONIC SENSORS. m IS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF READINGS RECORDED FROM EACH
EACH SENSOR. m
3
, 2m
3
MEANS ONE THIRD OF THE DATA IS USED FOR TRAINING AND TWO THIRD IS USED FOR TESTING RESPECTIVELY. THE FIRST
COLUMN IN THE TABLE SHOWS CHUNK SIZE OF DATA USED TO EXTRACT FEATURES.
Chunk Size (s) / Data Segmentation m
2
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2
m
3
, 2m
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m
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4
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5
m
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10
60 95.13% 95.56% 95.14% 93.56% 88.52%
120 96.43% 96.43% 95.6% 93.86% 92.61%
250 97% 95.82% 94.74% 94.37% 91.62%
500 96.72% 95.59% 95.20% 94.13% 85.09%
700 96.74% 95.66% 91.51% 90.55% 77.08%
1000 96.88% 93.25% 90.62% 83.75% 69.25%
TABLE 5. OVERALL RESULT
Sensor Type and Model Number of Sensors Identification Accuracy
Ultrasonic Level Sensor iSOLV LevelWizard II 3 90%
Electromagnetic Flowmeter (SWaT) iSOLV EFS803/CFT183 4 96%
Dual Transducer Ultrasonic Level Sensor HC-SR04 (5V) 15 97.65%
Dual Transducer Ultrasonic Level Sensor version 2 HC-SR04 (3 5V) 5 97.36%
Sonar: Single Transducer Range Finder SRF02 3 90%
Electromagnetic Flowmeter (WaDI) iSOLV EFS803/CFT183 4 98.2%
Differential Pressure Transmitter iSOLV SPT 200 8 92.5%
RADAR: RF Level Sensor iSOLV RD700 2 99%
Table 3 shows the TPR and FPR for each of the sensors.
Eq. 2, gives us the percentage of rightly classified sensor
(TPR), while Eq. 3 gives the percentage of mis-classification
of sensor (FPR). Ideally, FPR = 0 and TPR = 1 for per-
fect classification. Table 3 shows the results for 20 ultrasonic
sensors labeled as S1, S2, ..., S20, where the TPR is 100%
and FPR is 0% for nearly all sensors.
RQ3: How accurately can we identify sensors? Table 5
shows the sensor identification accuracy for all 44 sensors
used in our study. This table lists the type and model of sen-
sors, number of sensors, and identification accuracy obtained
in the experiments. It is noted that the lowest identification
accuracy is 90% for 5 sensors and, the remaining 27 sensors
have identification accuracy above 97% for their sensor
type, respectively. These results highlight the significance
of NoiSense.
4.4. Scalability of the NoiSense
RQ4: Is a fingerprint unique against many sensors such
as is the case in large plants? Data from the experiments
reported here does not provide a clear answer to this ques-
tion as we had limited sensors in the lab to test the idea
of fingerprinting. We also do not have any theoretical proof
of scalability. However, we experimented on tens of small
ultrasonic sensors, which gives an indication of scalability
of NoiSense. The experiment was designed using a set
of 20 dual transducer ultrasonic sensors. 5 sensors were
selected randomly out of these 20 sensors and identification
accuracy calculated using SVM. Then, 10 sensors were
selected randomly, followed by 15 and ultimately all 20
sensors were selected. The idea is to explore if identification
accuracy drops as the number of sensors to be identified is
increased. The results are shown in Table 6. Identification
accuracy does not drop by increasing the number of sensors
in the identification pool. This result is intuitive as the
idea of NoiSense results from the assumption that each
device has unique noise characteristics due to manufacturing
imperfections. By increasing the number of devices, the
confusion for a classifier does not necessarily increase as
each device brings it’s own unique fingerprint. This shows
that the idea of NoiSense is scalable for a larger number of
sensors.
4.5. Stability of NoiSense
RQ5: Is the sensor fingerprint stable between different
runs of the experiment over a period of time? Several
experiments were performed to answer this question. Data
collection phase for the level sensors installed in the water
treatment testbed was spread over a period of six months.
Results shown in Table 5, for the case of iSOLV Level
Wizard 2(level sensor in SWaT) are representative of this
experiment. From these results we conclude that sensor
fingerprints are stable over long periods of time (i.e. six
months in our study).
Besides collecting data over long periods of times on the
water treatment testbed, another experiment was designed to
TABLE 6. RANDOMLY SELECTED SENSORS VS. ACCURACY.
Number of Sensors Accuracy (Chunk Size (s) = 120)
5 96.97%
10 97.92%
15 97.65%
20 96.43%
test with low cost ultrasonic sensors. To see if the sensor
fingerprint is stable between different runs of the NoiSense,
data was collected for 3 hours for each sensor and then
remove those from the tank and Arduino board (we refer to
it as ”first run”). Then, in the second run, the sensor was
placed back on the tank and connected with the Arduino
board. Features from the collected data are compared across
in two runs. A visual representation of this experiment is
shown in Figure 7. Here the first run is on the left hand
and second on the right hand column. The top pane shows
the time domain data plotted for a sample of two sensors.
The time domain data is the same from first run to second
run. However, shape and variance of time domain signal
looks similar for the two sensors. To further distinguish and
to motivate the need for using spectral features, frequency
response (Fourier Transform) was plotted in the middle and
bottom pane for sensor1 and sensor2, respectively. From the
middle and bottom panes, we can see the frequency bins
(x-axis) for peak magnitude is different for both the sensors
even though the signal might look similar in time domain,
but they have distinguishable spectral features. In Figure 7,
if we look horizontally we can see that these features
are present from one run to the second, thus showing the
stability of sensor fingerprints.
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Figure 7. Stability of the NoiSense for the case of two small ultrasonic
sensors. Run 1 corresponds to data collected for three hours, run 2 for
two hours after removal and re-installation of sensor. In time domain both
sensors time series look similar but frequency response is distinguishable
and also stable for different runs.
TABLE 7. ANALOG SENSOR SPOOFING ATTACK DETECTION.
Number of Sensors Attack Detection Accuracy
10 100.0%
7 99.64%
3 99.28%
4.6. Analog Sensor Spoofing Attack Detection
RQ6: Is the sensor fingerprint based method, able to
detect analog sensor spoofing attack? We extend attack
detection performance of the proposed sensor fingerprinting
method to detect analog sensor spoofing attacks. Experi-
ments are designed, on attacks reported in the literature [12].
Such an attacker model is shown in Figure 1 where an
attacker spoofs the reading before it reaches the sensing
device. Experimental setup is shown in Figure 11, in Ap-
pendix E. The experiment was designed to measure the
distance from a wall using active ultrasonic sensors. An
active sensor has a transmitter (TX) that transmits a probe
signal, and a receiver (RX) that listens to a response signal
based on which the physical quantity is measured. It can
also be applied in a similar way for the case of water level
measurement in a water treatment plant. A legitimate sensor
is placed at a fixed distance from the wall and an attacker is
brought to transmit a response signal that deceives the sensor
into believing that the spoofed signal is the actual echo from
the wall. Data was collected before and after the start of
the attack. Results are shown in Table 7. For 20 ultrasonic
sensors, the attack is detected soon after it is launched.
Data was collected and labeled in attack and attack-free
scenarios. SVM was used to classify the presence of an
attacker based on ground truth (labeled data). The intuition
behind sensor fingerprint is that it is a unique characteristic
for a pair of transmitter (TX) and receiver (RX) for an active
sensor. Since, during this attack, RX is actually getting a
sound wave from another TX, violating that fingerprint. This
observation is intuitive, as presence of an active attacker in
victim’s vicinity, raise the energy (impeding sound waves on
transducer) in the environment [15] and changes the noise
pattern for the sensor’s receiving transducer [63].
Theoretical Proof: In the following, theoretical guarantee is
provided for detection of analog sensor spoofing attacks. To
understand this, we need look at how these sensors work.
For example, in ultrasonic sensors, sound waves vibrate the
diaphragm of the transducer and sound energy is converted
into electrical signal and appears at the output of the trans-
ducer. This produced voltage is proportional to the strength
of sound vibrations and is the signal of interest. This analog
signal has sensor noise effects in it. In the literature [63],
signal to noise ratio (SNR) is used to analyze the effects
of noise on a signal.
Definition 1. Noise floor: The magnitude of noise in a
sensing device is referred to as ‘noise floor’ [63].
Definition 2. Energy of a time domain signal (S) can be
calculated as:
S =
∫ T
0
V 2dt (4)
where V is the voltage level of the signal, and T is time
window for which S is measured [15].
Definition 3. Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR): It is defined as
a ratio of signal energy (S) to noise energy (N ) [63].
Theorem 1. Let SNRs = SsNs , be sensor’s signal to noise
ratio. Under analog sensor spoofing attack, noise floor
changes and SNRs deviates from the one under normal
operation, and the attack is detected.
Proof. The proof of the theorem follows directly from
Definitions 1-3 and a similar analog signal contamination
argument made in [15]. Suppose the signal to noise ratio at a
sensor is given as SNRs = SsNs , where Ss is signal strength
and Ns is sensor noise at the output of the transducer of
the sensor. During the attack signal to noise ratio becomes
SNRa =
Ss+Sa
Ns , where SNRa is signal to noise ratio
under attack and Sa is the attacker’s signal energy. Since
Ss + Sa 6= Ss, hence SNRa 6= SNRs. From this result
we can see that in the presence of an attacker, noise floor
is changed and since NoiSense, is based on sensor’s noise
pattern, attack will be detected as sensor’s fingerprint could
not be authenticated.
4.7. Discussion
Accuracy: The proposed method is intended to comple-
ment the existing intrusion detection systems. Legacy in-
trusion detection systems are either host based or network
based [64], and hence those may not detect physical or
analog sensor spoofing attacks. The method proposed in this
work is based on the physical structure and hardware of the
devices, making it an intrusion detection system for physical
attacks. However, because of the very nature of the proposed
scheme, feature vector has some randomness and few sen-
sors occasionally have overlapping feature sets. This leads
to an identification accuracy less than 100%. Nevertheless,
in the majority of the cases, sensor identification accuracy
more than 97% was achieved which makes our proposed
method comparable to those proposed in the literature.
Scalability: Results in the previous section indicate that
NoiSense scales well with an increase in the number of
sensors to be fingerprinted. However, in comparison with the
device fingerprinting work in CPS domain, authors in [26],
created fingerprints for 2 relay devices, from two different
vendors, with an accuracy of 92%. In comparison, our
method performs better with an accuracy of 97% for tens
of different sensors of same model.
Robustness against Forgery: Even though an adversary had
learned the sensor noise, we believe each new device has
it’s own noise, so when an adversary replaces a device,
it can not modify it’s hardware to get the same noise
pattern as another device without affecting its performance
or intended application. Physically tampering a the device
would change the noise pattern. If we assume a powerful
attacker who can learn the noise distribution and reproduce
it, our proposed scheme is still helpful for raising the bar
for attackers. Learning hardware characteristics, for all the
hardware devices in the network, is time consuming and will
likely raise suspicion and ultimately reveal the presence of
an attacker to system operators.
Application in Real-World CPS: We have collected and
tested the proposed method for a data set collected over a
period of six months in a real water treatment testbed and
for a couple of week data from a water distribution testbed.
The results are promising for such a time period. However,
it is recommended to train the classifiers after every plant
maintenance cycle. Moreover, being used in a testbed for
six months is different from being used in a real world pro-
duction system of physical plants with possibly more harsh
environment especially for the case of level measurements
including rivers, dams etc. Although the testbeds used in the
reported experiments imitates real water treatment plants as
close as possible but we believe the sensors and actuators
wear out with time, rendering them less accurate. There is
a possibility that those environmental effects may change
the fingerprint but according to our hypothesis each sensor
will be affected in a distinct way and, if retrained, will
possess a unique fingerprint. As far as the ambient noise or
interference is concerned that would affect all the devices
in a similar manner, letting us to cancel out those effects
from sensor fingerprint.
5. Towards Physical Quantity based Challenge-
Response Protocol
The proposed NoiSense works well in the case of phys-
ical manipulation or physical layer signal spoofing in the
sensor. However, it is challenged by attackers who can learn
and inject the correct sensor noise in the digital domain
while spoofing the real measurements. For example, in
the case of a replay attack, sensor noise from previous
readings also gets replayed while preserving the sensor
noise fingerprint. Another example is a traditional man-in-
the-middle attacker who can learn the sensor noise pattern
and, while injecting fake sensor measurements, also adds
the sensor noise fingerprint making it hard for NoiSense
to detect such an attack. We propose a novel challenge-
response protocol in which a challenge is produced in the
physical quantity to be measured. Traditionally, a challenge
is generated in the digital domain [12], [22] and its effect
is observed on sensor measurements. In our scheme, the
challenge originates from the physical/analog domain. The
challenger, will be between the physical quantity and the
receiver (RX) of the sensor. We send the challenge as a fake
measurement and observe it’s effect in sensor’s output. This
proposed challenge-response protocol, enables NoiSense, to
detect a strong cyber adversary. Essentially, a special sort of
analog spoofing attack is launched which, as discussed in the
previous sections, is expected to be reflected and identifiable
Figure 8. Challenge-Response Protocol.
by the sensor readings, as this attack will change the noise
fingerprint.
Consider the attack scenario Replay and Advanced Sen-
sor Spoofing Attack( S8) as explained in section 2.1. The
proposed challenge-response protocol would detect replay
attack as the attacker would not be able to replicate the effect
of a fresh challenge. Now, consider an even stronger attacker
who can actively receive sensor data and tries to discover
the presence of the challenge. We train the machine learning
algorithm on legitimate sensor-challenger pair fingerprint
in addition to training it for sensor noise fingerprint. With
the challenge-response protocol, NoiSense tests sensor data
for the presence of the sensor’s as well as the challenger’s
fingerprint. In the presence of a challenge, an active attacker
can observe the change in the sensor fingerprint but it
needs time to learn the challenger’s fingerprint. Machine
learning based identification works on a chunk of data,
and it takes time to collect that data and to make a de-
cision. Therefore, an attacker needs some time and a chunk
of data to learn challenger’s fingerprint. After learning th
challenger’s fingerprint, an attacker might try to add the
effect of challenger’s noise in sensor measurements but it
will appear with a delay (due to the time it took to learn
the change), which will likely expose the attacker. There is
an important consideration in designing such a challenge-
response protocol; so that it should not effect the normal
functionality of the industrial control system.
Design of Challenge-Response Protocol: In Figure 8, a
proposed setup for challenge-response protocol is shown. A
challenger is a device similar to the one used for sensing.
This challenger is placed between the active sensor and the
measured entity. While active sensor waits for response to
the probe signal, the challenger transmits a signal to spoof
the fake reading. This is similar to analog sensor spoofing
attack as explained in section 2.1. Unlike analog spoofing
attack, the challenger needs to spoof a reading hat is close
to the reading that would be received by a real sensor. A
naive challenger would send a random reading that is not
close to the real quantity and we would be able to observe
it’s effect on the sensor’s data but it might disturb the
physical process as our challenger itself is attacking sensor
measurements. One important consideration in the design
of challenger is to not disturb the control logic because
of the added challenge in the sensor data. Receiver (RX)
is used as the challenger to receive the probe signal from
the active sensor’s transmitter (TX). Based on the probe
signal, the challenger can calculate a quantity to be spoofed.
For example, if the sensor is an ultrasonic sensor used to
measure the distance, then by listening to sensor’s probe
signal, the challenger is able to calculate the exact quantity
and it can generate the new spoofed signal which is close
to the real quantity. Thus the spoofed signal will not trigger
any wrong actuation due to the added challenge in the sensor
but will change the noise fingerprint of the sensor. Such a
challenger may not work in all cyber physical systems but it
is practical in the use cases studied in this work. In the case
of an ultrasonic level sensor installed in the testbeds used
in this work, the challenger can be placed, for example, on
water surface on a buoy, and it would be able to calculate
the challenge signal which is close to the real system state.
Following are the steps to create a challenge as shown in
Figure 8:
1) Transmitter (TX) of the active sensor sends a probe
signal towards the quantity to be measured.
2) Response signal arrives at the sensor’s receiver
(RX) resulting in measurement of the physical
quantity.
3) Receiver (RX) of the challenger is passively listen-
ing to probe signals. This eavesdropping will help
it to calculate the amount of signal to be spoofed
so that it does not disturb the control logic.
4) Transmitter (TX) of the challenger spoofs a signal
to the receiver (RX) of the active sensor. The
amount of fake measurement to be transmitted is
calculated in step 3. This will keep the measurement
close to the real quantity but change the noise
fingerprint of the sensor.
Security argument:: The proposed challenge is an instance
of an analog spoofing attack, which has been shown to alter
the noise profile of the sensor under test in the previous
subsection. Therefore, by challenging a sensor at a random
time t for a random δ period, we expect the values of
the sensor (as for instance reflected in the ICS historian)
to have the (anomalous) noise fingerprint of an analog
spoofing attack. If not, we can suspect a cyber attacker to be
spoofing the historian values. An attacker who is aware of
this challenge-response, but at the same time is spoofing the
real values, needs thus to consistently reflect the anomalous
noise profile starting at time t and for δ seconds. However,
if the challenge is close to the real physical measurement,
an attacker needs to wait ∆ seconds in order to recognize
that the noise profile has changed, at the beginning and at
the end of the challenge. Therefore, he can at most react
consistently with the expectations of the challenger at time
t + ∆ and stop at t + δ + ∆. As is shown in the previous
sections, ∆ needed to detect a change in the noise profile is
significant (around 1 minute) and can be leveraged to detect
incoherent responses to the challenge.
6. Related work
Device Fingerprinting: The approach presented in this
article is inspired by the idea of using sensor noise as a fin-
gerprint for camera identification [65]. In [65], images are
taken by a camera and filtered to obtain noise components
and averaged for all images. This resultant noise vector acts
as a reference pattern for test images. An image is tested
against reference patterns for all cameras being studied and
matched with one having the highest correlation with im-
age’s noise vector. In [66] prospects of sensor identification,
based on [65], are studied. The authors analyzed the effects
of varying number of images to get a reference pattern. It
is shown that the noise fingerprinting method as in [65],
can be used to counteract injection attacks at the time of
checks in biometric systems as well as to establish evidence
in a criminal incidence. In [67] a method for image au-
thentication from flatbed desktop scanners is presented. This
method is similar to that used in earlier works for identifying
digital cameras using pattern noise of the imaging sensor.
In [68] seven techniques for extracting unique signatures
from NAND flash devices are studied. These techniques
are experimentally evaluated using thirteen different flash
memory devices. The techniques can help identify and au-
thenticate electronic devices that use flash devices. The idea
of fingerprinting a device remotely based on it’s hardware is
presented in [28]. Small microscopic deviations in device’s
clock [69], [70] are used as fingerprint for the particular
device. In [71] inter arrival time of packets is analyzed to
fingerprint devices on a small campus network. In [29], 50
RFID smart cards from the same manufacturer and type are
tested for fingerprints.
Smartphone Fingerprinting: In [32] hardware imperfections
during the sensor manufacturing process are exploited as
a fingerprint. Accelerometers in smartphones are used to
create fingerprints. Experimental results show that when the
properties of these imperfections are extracted, the device,
and ultimately a user, can be identified. In [72] a smart-
phone speaker is used as a fingerprint component. During
fabrication, subtle imperfections arise in device speakers
which induce anomalies in produced sounds. Experimental
results show high accuracy of the proposed method for
speakers from same as well as different vendors. Another
work [73] used sensor fingerprinting to identify a mobile
device. In [73] the speakerphone-microphone system and
the accelerometer in a typical smartphone were used to
identify the mobile device. The article listed types of sensors
and the related imperfections which can be useful in iden-
tifying systems. [74] analyze techniques to mitigate device
fingerprinting either by calibrating the sensors to eliminate
the signal anomalies, or by adding noise that obfuscates the
anomalies.
Software based Fingerprinting: A technique is proposed
[75], that identifies the wireless device driver running on
an IEEE 802.11 compliant device by passive monitoring. In
[76] unique devices over a Wireless Local Area Network
(WLAN) are fingerprinted in a passive manner through
the timing analysis of 802.11 probe request frames. Nmap
[77], uses active fingerprinting by sending specific requests
to determine operating systems and server versions. On
the other hand p0f [78], is a tool which can determine
operating system and browser version of a client by pas-
sively monitoring TCP and HTTP header fields. The version
and configuration information of the web browser will be
transmitted to websites upon request [79], which can be
used to fingerprint the devices on which these browsers are
running. In [80], indirect history data, such as information
about categories of visited websites can also be effective in
fingerprinting users. In [81], 25 applications on cloud are
fingerprinted based on cache access pattern.
RF Fingerprinting: RF fingerprints have been proposed us-
ing a measured temporal link signature to uniquely identify
the link between a transmitter and a receiver [30], [82]. A
similar approach based on received signal strength is shown
for the case study of a smart water treatment plant [83].
Modulation domain of RF signals is also studied to generate
unique device fingerprints [84]. Researchers have shown that
signal waveforms can also be used for device fingerprint-
ing amid manufacturing inconsistencies [31], [85]. Besides
wireless fingerprinting research has shown that it is possible
to fingerprint devices based on Ethernet NICs analog signals
[33].
CPS Device fingerprinting: In [26] authors focus on the
idea of device fingerprinting in ICS. One approach in [26]
is based on traditional network traffic monitoring and ob-
serving message response times, while the second approach
is based on physical operation times of a device. Analysis
is carried out on 2 latching relays based on their operation
timings. Another related work presented a preliminary study,
on the idea of sensor fingerprinting in [86], using 2 sensors,
based on correlation analysis with an accuracy of 86%.
However, to the best of our knowledge, this article present
the first attempt to present a rigorous analysis on a multitude
of sensors specific to ICS. Our machine learning based
sensor fingerprint successfully identifies sensors with an
accuracy as high as 99%. This is first work to present a
holistic scheme to detect physical and cyber attacks using
physical quantity based challenge-response protocol.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a sensor identification
technique for ICS. The proposed method creates a fin-
gerprint of each sensor based on sensor’s noise statistics.
The feature set used is extracted from sensor noise and
is leveraged for sensor identification. Machine learning is
used to identify the installed sensors. Uniqueness in the
fingerprint is the result of manufacturing imperfections even
for the same type and model of the device. The results
in this article point to an effective method for hardware
identification without affecting the performance of the host
system. The results reported show that it is possible to
identify whether test data is generated by the installed sensor
or by a replaced sensor. Out of a 44 total sensors, 31 were
identified with an accuracy more than 96% and 13 with
an accuracy above 90%. Also, using true positive and false
positive rate as a metric, we got a true positive rate of
100% for most of the sensors and a false positive rate of
0%. Analog sensor spoofing attacks are detected with an
accuracy of 100%. Moreover, a challenge-response protocol
is proposed that is able to detect advanced cyber attackers
by means of sensor fingerprinting.
In the future, we plan to extend the proposed technique
to fingerprint actuators as well. Also we plan to extend
the feature set considered for fingerprinting based on the
physical working principles of sensors.
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Appendix A.
Physical Sensor Swap Attack in SWaT Testbed
An Example Attack: An attack scenario is created, com-
prising attacker goal of physical damage(G1), an insider
with the physical access (C1) and with an objective of
deceiving the controllers (O3). Sensor swap attack, as
explained in Section 2.1, can achieve attacker’s goal as
shown in following attack, which is launched on a real
water treatment testbed. During the normal operation of the
plant, if s11 indicates a low water level in tank 1, PLC1
issues a command to stop the outlet pump, to avoid dry
running of the pump (which can result in physical damage).
Similarly, if the tank 1 is full (based on s11 values), the inlet
to tank 1 should be closed to avoid flooding. But if we swap
sensor s11 with sensor s22, the new sensor configuration
is s21 which means sensor 2 is placed on top of tank 1
(but this sensor is still transmitting data to PLC2) and s12
which represents sensor 1 on tank 2 (but this sensor is still
transmitting data to PLC1). Now, as soon as we start the
attack, s21 indicates that the tank level is high (which indeed
is high as it is placed over tank 1 instead of tank 2), PLC2
will keep running the outlet pump ultimately resulting in
pump running dry and damage (assuming that there is no
mechanical interlock that prevents dry running).
Figure 9 illustrates the impact of a sensor swap attack.
The attack start and end times are as labeled in Figure 9.
When the attack starts, the level readings from s11 and
s22 get exchanged. As the sensors are physically swapped,
they keep sending data to their respective PLCs but those
measurements are no longer coming from the same normal
process. If the attack is not removed, the pump at stage
two would be damaged, as it would continue to run without
any water in the tank. The pump will stay ON because the
corresponding level sensor is transmitting high water level
to PLC. Note that as programmed in water treatment testbed,
the PLC logic has a low water level limit below which it
is dangerous to keep pumping. However, due to this attack,
the PLC can be deceived. Regions A, B and C in Figure 9
show, respectively, the sensor readings before, during, and
after the attack. A detailed analysis on such an attack and
preliminary results based on sensor fingerprint, is presented
in form of a short paper [86].
Appendix B.
Support Vector Machine Classifier
SVM is a data classification technique used in many
areas such as speech recognition, image recognition and so
on [87]. The aim of SVM is to produce a model based on the
training data and give classification results for testing data.
For a training set of instance-label pairs (xi, yi), i = 1, ..., k
where xi ∈ Rn and y ∈ {1,−1}k, SVM require the solution
of the following optimization problem:
minimize
w,b,ζ
1
2
wTw + C
k∑
i=1
ζi
subject to yi(wTφ(xi) + b) ≥ 1− ζi,
where ζi ≥ 0.
(5)
The function ζ maps the training vectors into a higher
dimensional space. In this higher dimensional space a linear
separating hyperplane is found by SVM, where C > 0 is the
penalty parameter of the error term. For the kernel function
in this work we use the radial basis function:
K(xi, xj) = exp(−γ||xi − xj ||2), γ > 0. (6)
In our work, we have multiple sensors to classify. There-
fore, multi-class SVM library LIBSVM [60] is used.
Appendix C.
Water Treatment Testbed
It is a fully operational (research facility) scaled down
water treatment plant producing 5 gallons/minute of doubly
filtered water, this testbed mimics large modern plants for
water treatment. Following is the brief overview of the
testbed, for further details, please refer to [34].
Water Treatment Process: The treatment process consists
of six distinct stages each controlled by an independent
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). Control actions are
taken by the PLCs using data from sensors. Stage P1
controls the inflow of water to be treated by opening or
closing a motorized valve MV-101. Water from the raw
water tank is pumped via a chemical dosing station (stage
P2, chlorination) to another UF (Ultra Filtration) feed water
tank in stage P3. A UF feed pump in P3 sends water via UF
unit to RO (Reverse Osmosis) feed water tank in stage P4.
Here an RO feed pump sends water through an ultraviolet
dechlorination unit controlled by a PLC in stage P4. This
step is necessary to remove any free chlorine from the water
prior to passing it through the reverse osmosis unit in stage
P5. Sodium bisulphate (NaHSO3) can be added in stage P4
to control the ORP (Oxidation Reduction Potential). In stage
P5, the dechlorinated water is passed through a 2-stage RO
filtration unit. The filtered water from the RO unit is stored
in the permeate tank and the reject in the UF backwash tank.
Stage P6 controls the cleaning of the membranes in the UF
unit by turning on or off the UF backwash pump.
Communication Network and Vulnerabilities: Each PLC
in the testbed obtains data from sensors associated with
the corresponding stage, and controls pumps and valves in
its domain. PLCs communicate with each other through a
separate network. Communications among sensors, actua-
tors, and PLCs can be via either wired or wireless links.
Attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the protocol used, and
in the PLC firmware, are feasible and could compromise
the communication links between sensors and PLCs, PLCs
and actuators, among the PLCs, and the PLCs themselves.
Having compromised one or more links, an attacker could
use one of several strategies to send fake state data to one
or more PLCs.
Appendix D.
Water Distribution Testbed
It is an operational testbed supplying 10 US gallons/min
of filtered water. It represents a scaled-down version of
a large water distribution network in a city. It contains
three distinct control processes labeled P1 through P3, each
controlled by its own set of PLCs.
Stages in WADI: Water distribution process is segmented
into the following sub-processes: P1: Primary grid, P2:
Secondary grid, P3: Return water grid.
Primary grid: The primary grid contains two raw water
tanks of 2500 liters each, and a level sensor (1-LIT-001)
to monitor the water level in the tanks. Water intake into
these two tanks can be from the water treatment plant, from
Public Utility Board inlet, or from the return water grid.
A chemical dosing system is installed to maintain adequate
water quality. Sensors are installed to measure the water
quality parameters of the water flowing into and out of the
primary grid.
Secondary grid: This grid has two elevated reservoir tanks
and six consumer tanks. Raw water tanks supply water to
the elevated reservoir tanks and, in turn, these tanks supply
water to the consumer tanks based on a pre-set demand
pattern. Once consumer tanks meet their demands, water
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Figure 10. Experiment setup with small ultrasonic sensors (HCSR04). A
glass of water is filled up to a marked level to simulate the water tank.
Sensors are controlled by Arduino Uno and data is collected.
drains to the return water grid. Return water grid is equipped
with a tank.
Communications Infrastructure:
The communication network contains layer-0 (L0),
layer-1 (L1) and layer 2-(L2). L0 is at process level and
connects actuators/sensors and I/O modules via RS485-
Modbus protocol. L1 is the plant control network where
all PLCs are connected to a central node in a star topol-
ogy. Communication among PLCs and RTUs takes place
over Ethernet switches using NIP/SP based on TCP and
High Speed Packet Access (HSPA) cellular gateways using
GPRS modem. L2 is a communication network between a
touch panel Human-Machine Interface (HMI) and the plant
control network. This network is implemented using star
topology and consists of PLCs and RTUs. A firewall isolates
the enterprise network from the plant control network. A
SCADA workstation provides an interface between the plant
operators and PLCs for remote monitoring and control.
Appendix E.
Supporting Figures/Tables
Figure 11. Experiment setup with small ultrasonic sensors (HCSR04). A
experiment is set to measure a fixed distance between the sensor and the
wall. Sensors are controlled by Arduino Uno and data is collected.
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Figure 12. Confusion matrix for 20 small ultrasonic sensors.
